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ABSTRACT
Hindsight bias has been operationally defined as “…the tendency for people with
outcome knowledge (hindsight) to believe falsely that they would have predicted the
reported outcome of an event” (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990, pg. 311). The role of empathy
in hindsight bias has not received systematic attention. Previous research has shown that
giving participants prevention information increased hindsight bias (Kubany, 2005).
Thus, the current study hypothesized that hindsight participants placed in empathic
situations should show greater probability judgments for the outcome than hindsight
participants in no empathic conditions, and both should be greater than participants in
foresight conditions. Participants were 166 male and female college students recruited
from Introductory Psychology classes at a Midwestern university. For the current study,
the empathy manipulation did not produce significant results. This could be due to the
story content, the empathy induction method, or the time of the empathy assessment.
Overall, no effect for hindsight bias was demonstrated. The empathy manipulation was
not shown to be effective nor did the prevention information appear to increase levels of
Hindsight Bias/Responsibility. These results, which contradict previous research, indicate
need for further exploration of hindsight bias, which could impact therapist effectiveness
and the symptom severity of mental health diagnoses.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Hindsight bias has been operationally defined as “…the tendency for people with
outcome knowledge (hindsight) to believe falsely that they would have predicted the
reported outcome of an event” (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990, pg. 311). Fischhoff (1975) in
his seminal studies pertaining to hindsight bias defined this idea as “the overestimation of
the likelihood of an event, after learning the outcome” or the “I-knew-it-all-along” effect.
In a series of studies, Fischhoff established that people judge event outcomes as more
probable from a hindsight perspective if they are presented as the factual outcomes, as
compared to judging the same outcomes as possibilities in foresight without actual
outcome knowledge. He also showed that exaggerated hindsight probabilities persisted
when participants were instructed to ignore the factual outcome and make their
judgments as they would have done in foresight and when they were asked to put
themselves in the shoes of others who did not possess outcome knowledge. He refers to
this phenomenon as creeping determinism, which is the tendency to view event outcomes
in hindsight as more inevitable or foreseeable than they appeared in foresight (Blank,
Musch, & Pohl, 2007).
Hindsight Bias in Context
Hindsight bias can be seen in a variety of contexts. Participants demonstrated
hindsight bias in making judgments about rape victims (Carli & Leonard, 1989; JanoffBulman, Timko, & Carli, 1985) and individuals who experienced negative environmental
events (Williams, Lees-Haley, and Brown, 1993; Brown, Williams, & Lees-Haley, 1994;
Williams, Lees-Haley, & Price, 1996). Relevant to counseling and clinical psychology,
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hindsight bias creates problems in forensic evaluations (Borum, Otto, & Golding, 1993),
and clinical judgments (Gilibert & Banovic, 2009). Arkes, Saville, Wortmann, and
Harkness (1981) showed that hindsight bias can lead to compromises in diagnostic
accuracy as physicians with hindsight information gave higher probability estimates to
the known-to-have-occurred diagnoses than the corresponding probability estimate
obtained from physicians who only had foresight and no after-the-fact knowledge.
Factors Influencing Hindsight Bias
Despite the fact that the implications and impact of hindsight bias are widespread,
not much is known about potential moderators of hindsight bias. According to the fluency
attribution hypothesis, a variety of constructs can influence hindsight bias. Fluency can
be defined as the speed, ease, and accuracy with which a stimulus is processed (Bernstein
& Harley, 2007), and can be enhanced with numerous variables, including clarity,
familiarity, and presentation duration. Specifically, one construct that has not been given
much attention in its relationship to hindsight bias is empathy, which is defined as an
affective response to the cognitive processing of information about another’s state or
condition (Zhou, Valiente, & Eisenberg, 2003). To qualify as empathy, the empathizer
must recognize on some level the emotion he or she is experiencing is a reflection of the
other’s emotional, psychological, or physical state. Specifically, empathy induction has
been shown by various researchers to have behavioral consequences. Empathy induction
involves experimentally generating an other-oriented emotional response congruent with
another’s perceived welfare (Batson et al., 1997). Batson and Moran (1999) induced
empathy for half of the participants and created a one-trial prisoner’s dilemma. In a
typical prisoner’s dilemma, it makes sense for individuals to cooperate some of the time
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but not every time. Women who were led to feel empathy for the other participant
demonstrated significantly higher cooperation than those women who were not led to feel
empathy, despite the fact that they had to bear the costs of cooperating. Batson, Early,
and Salvarani (1997) and Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland (2002) showed that induced
empathy toward a member of a stigmatized group led to improved attitudes toward these
groups, including individuals with AIDS, homeless persons, and addicts. Shih, Wang,
Trahan, and Stotzer (2009) found that taking the perspective of an outgroup member
reduced prejudice and discriminatory behavior against other outgroup members. Johnson
et al., (2002) demonstrated that empathy has an impact in judicial decision making.
Participants were placed into one of three conditions: no empathy, low empathy, or high
empathy for the defendant. Participants in the high empathy condition reported greater
empathy and assigned more lenient punishments than those participants in the no
empathy and low empathy conditions. Empathy has also been shown to be incompatible
with aggression and can act as a relaxation technique (Tyson, 1998) as well as to inhibit
aggressive and antisocial behaviors (Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). Empathic induction has
even been documented in children. Thompson and Hoffman (1980) gave elementary aged
children stories describing explicit wrongful acts. Participants were asked how they
would feel if they were the wrongdoer and why. Children who had received prior
encouragement to empathize with the victim exhibited more intense guilt than those who
had not.
Implications for Applied Settings.
The importance of empathy, although not experimentally induced, extends
beyond research settings. Accurate empathy has been shown to be positively correlated
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with patient improvement in therapy (Truax, 1970). According to Norcross (2002),
empathy accounts for as much and probably more outcome variance than does specific
intervention. Tempel (2007) demonstrated that social workers who experienced being
with the client in certain situations or being in particular contexts related to the client
could bring about changes in the worker, particularly leading to an increase in empathy.
Exposure to educational activities in empathy, philosophical values and meaning, and
wellness during medical school has been shown to increase empathy and wellness in
medical practice (DiLalla, Hull, & Dorsey, 2004). In geriatric populations, empathy is
considered a key factor in therapeutic treatment (Yesavage & Karasu, 1982). Finally, one study
showed nursing home residents’ perceptions of empathy were significantly related to the residents’ self-rated
depression (Hollinger-Samson

& Pearson, 2000). Based on these studies, it is clear why

empathy is an important construct to study, for both clinicians and researchers.
Empathy and Hindsight Bias.
Despite the amount of interest empathy has generated (12,000+ articles found in
the PsychInfo database alone), the role of empathy in hindsight bias has not received
systematic attention. However, several investigators (Carli and Leonard, 1989; Kubany,
Watson, Leisen, & Kaplan, 2005; Menec & Weiner, 2000; Tykocinski, Pick, & Kedmi,
2002) have provided empathy-like instructions to their participants for hindsight bias
studies. Menec and Weiner (2000) conducted three studies to study the effects of
hindsight bias and judgments of responsibility. One of the three studies of particular
importance focused on genetic screening. Participants in the hindsight conditions were
given a scenario to read in which a woman declined taking a genetic screening test and
then gave birth to either a healthy child (positive outcome) or a child with a genetic
disorder (negative outcome). Participants were told to imagine the scenario actually
4

occurred. After the participants learned whether or not the child had a genetic disorder,
they recorded the probability of three outcomes: the probability that the child would be
born with a specific genetic disorder, the probability that the child would be healthy, and
a filler item, which was the probability that the child would have a different disorder. The
probabilities were to sum to 100%. Participants in the foresight (no outcome information)
condition were asked to estimate the likelihood that the child would or would not have a
genetic disorder at birth without knowing the outcome. Participants in the negativeoutcome condition judged the probability that the child would have the genetic disorder
higher than did individuals in the no-information or the positive-outcome condition.
However, the probability was only significantly higher between the negative-outcome
and the positive-outcome groups.
Similarly, Kubany Et al. (2005) in a series of studies used empathy-like
techniques for studies 2 and 3 in order to examine hindsight bias. Participants were asked
to imagine themselves in the situation in an attempt to better identify with the victim in a
traumatic scenario. Using a within-subjects design, participants first imagined themselves
involved in a traumatic scenario. Results provided evidence that hindsight bias is a causal
mechanism in trauma-related guilt. While Kubany did not look specifically at the
difference empathic understanding could have on the hindsight bias response, it seems
that identifying with the victim in the story could (in addition to the prevention materials)
could have influenced his findings.
Carli and Leonard (1989) employed empathy-like techniques by creating three
“vivid” scenarios in which participants were asked to assess the likelihood of a particular
outcome. Participants were placed into three groups, and each group was asked to read a
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scenario that either detailed a vivid negative (the woman was raped), a vivid positive (the
woman received a promotion), or a neutral (the woman received a ride home) ending.
Participants were then asked to rate the probability of three possible outcomes as if they
did not know the ending of the story. Participants in each groups rated the outcome they
received as significantly more likely than the other two outcomes, demonstrating the
hindsight effect. In a second study conducted by Carli (1999) participants were placed in
to four groups and given a story about a young woman living alone who meets a man in a
graduate school class. All four groups received a different outcome: the woman was
raped, the woman received a proposal, the woman began dating the man, or the woman
and the man had a one night stand. The story was written in the first person. Participants
were then asked to rate the likelihood of four possible endings to the story as if they did
not know the actual ending. The hindsight bias effect was found for each outcome, with
participants judging the outcome they received as significantly more likely than the other
three outcomes.
In Tykocinski Et al. (2002) participants read a story in which a graduate student
lost either a large or small stipend. The participants were randomly assigned to three
conditions, two hindsight conditions (self and other) and one foresight condition. In the
hindsight-self condition they were asked either to “imagine themselves in the situation
described to them” as opposed to the hindsight-other condition, in which they were to
“imagine that this story was told to them by a friend.” Participants in the foresight
condition read the hindsight-self version of the scenario, but were not given the outcome.
Students in hindsight-self and hindsight-other conditions rated the probability of
regaining the lost stipend significantly lower than those in the foresight condition,
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demonstrating the hindsight bias effect between the foresight and hindsight conditions,
but not between the two hindsight groups. While the authors do not directly state why
they created two hindsight conditions (self and other), the discussion states that people’s
foremost priority is to cope with personal misfortunes. Thus, these investigators felt that
an empathy-like state was important for the production of hindsight bias and the
magnitude of disappointment. This study exemplifies the importance of taking a closer
look at the impact of empathy on hindsight bias.
Hypotheses for Empathy.
The fluency attribution hypothesis and previous investigators’ use of empathylike instructions draw attention to the possibility that empathy may make certain
information more accessible to people and may influence their view of events and
outcomes, thus playing a role in hindsight bias. Based on these theories, hindsight
participants placed in empathic situations should show greater probability judgments for
the outcome than hindsight participants in no empathic conditions, and both should be
greater than participants in foresight conditions.
Kubany’s Multidimensional Model of Guilt
Kubany et al. (2005) defined guilt as an unpleasant feeling with accompanying
beliefs that one should have thought, felt, or acted differently—with implications of
hindsight bias/responsibility, wrongdoing, and insufficient justification for acting as one
did. Related to guilt cognitions in his multidimensional model is a subscale pertaining
specifically to hindsight bias. Guilt magnitude is determined by the following variables:
a) event-related distress, b) acceptance of personal responsibility for causing a negative
outcome, c) beliefs that one violated personal values, d) beliefs that one’s actions lacked
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sufficient justification, and e) beliefs about outcome foreseeability and preventability
(hindsight bias).
In the two studies conducted by Kubany et al. (2005), participants rated their
levels of hindsight bias/responsibility, justification, wrongdoing, and preventability
beliefs. Participants’ ratings of distress, guilt, as well as beliefs about responsibility,
justification, wrongdoing, and preventability increased significantly after they were
provided with preventability information. Based on these results, Kubany concluded that
giving participants prevention information increased hindsight bias.
Kubany’s research does not allow for a complete demonstration of hindsight bias
since he used a within-subjects design where participants in hindsight (outcome) made
their hindsight bias/responsibility judgments, were given prevention information, and
then were asked to do the ratings again. He did not have a control group, a group given
additional but neutral information that should not affect the participants’ hindsight
judgments. Howell (2006) utilized a between-subjects design with foresight and hindsight
conditions in an attempt to assess the importance of prevention materials on hindsight
bias. However, her results for hindsight bias were, at best, ambiguous, and if anything
revealed a tendency for reversing hindsight bias. Based on these results, there is little
evidence to show that prevention material does indeed increase hindsight bias. Thus, in
addition to the focus on empathy and as an exploratory investigation, the current study
will look at the possible impact of prevention information on hindsight bias by employing
a within-subjects methodology as Kubany did (2005) but will use a more traditional
measure of hindsight bias (probability) along with his measure of hindsight
bias/responsibility. The current study will also utilize a control group in which a foresight
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condition will receive additional but neutral information that should have no effect on
their hindsight ratings. Participants in the three conditions will (both hindsight groups) or
will not (foresight group) receive prevention information to allow for an assessment of
change in participants’ ratings as a result of the prevention information and empathy. The
inclusion of the repeated ratings for the foresight group allows for an assessment of the
repeated ratings without empathy and the prevention information.
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Chapter 2
METHOD
Participants
A sample of 166 male and female college students from Psychology 121 classes
were recruited from undergraduate psychology courses at Missouri State University.
Participants were given Informed Consent (see Appendix A) and filled out a
Demographic Information Form (see Appendix B). Participants were tested in a group
setting. Prior approval for this project was obtained from the Missouri State University
IRB (March 31, 2010; approval #10363).
Procedure
The study used a single factor design with foresight no-empathy, hindsight noempathy, and hindsight with empathy conditions, proportionally balanced for gender.
Participants were randomly assigned to these conditions. Both hindsight groups received
outcome information for an accident scenario whereas the foresight group did not have
this outcome information prior to making their judgments. Also, participants in the
hindsight conditions were asked to ignore the outcome information as they made their
judgments. Prior to reading the accident scenario, the hindsight empathy participants
were asked to place themselves in the scenario compared to the no-empathy participants,
who were asked to imagine that a “friend tells you a story.” Participants completed the
experiment in the following order: (1) read the scenario and completed empathy ratings,
(2) completed the Trauma-Related Guilt Inventory (TRGI) and hindsight bias ratings,
which were counterbalanced (3) were administered the prevention materials, and (4)
completed the TRGI and hindsight bias ratings again, which were counterbalanced. The
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foresight group was not be given any prevention materials; instead, they were given
information to read regarding a neutral historical event that was the same length as the
prevention material.
Measures
Scenarios and Prevention Information. Contingent on condition, participants were
given 1 of 3 different scenarios; these scenarios were hindsight (outcome) with empathy
(see Appendix C), hindsight (outcome) without empathy (see Appendix D), and foresight
(no outcome) without empathy (see Appendix E). Depending on the condition,
participants received prevention information with an empathy context (see Appendix F),
without an empathy context (see Appendix G) or no prevention information (see
Appendix H).
Empathy Manipulation. Empathy was assessed using Batson’s reaction
questionnaire (Batson et al., 1997; Batson et al., 2002). The questionnaire contained
adjectives describing different emotional states and was used to assess empathic feelings
for the individual in the scenario. For each adjective, participants were asked to report
how much they had experienced that emotion while reading the scenario (1 = not at all, 7
= extremely) (see Appendices I & J). The list included five characteristics: sympathy,
compassionate, softhearted, kind, and tender. This scale functioned as a manipulation
check to examine the extent to which participants identified with the individual in the
scenario.
Outcome Ratings. For an assessment of hindsight bias, participants were asked to
answer several questions. Using a Likert-Scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9
(extremely), participants were asked questions regarding the likelihood that his/her friend
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dies, the difficulty in predicting the outcome, whether the outcome was clearly
predictable, certainty about the outcome, how good was the prediction of outcome, how
surprised he/she would be if his/her friend lived, and how disappointed he/she that his/her
friend dies (see Appendices K, L, & M).
Kubany’s Hindsight Bias/Responsibility. Kubany et al., (2005) notion of hindsight
bias/responsibility (“I blame myself for what happened”), which is a subscale of the
Trauma-Related Guilt Inventory (TRGI) instrument, was used to assess the importance of
prevention information (see Appendices N & O). The TRGI has shown internal
consistency of the scales and subscales ranging from .60 to .94 with test-retest reliability
ranging from .73 to .86. Specifically, the Hindsight-Bias/Responsibility factor was shown
to correlate with other measures of guilt and with measures of posttraumatic stress
disorder, depression, and other indexes of adjustment (Kubany et al., 1996).
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Chapter 3
RESULTS
Although the original sample for the current study contained 166 participants, the
final analysis was conducted on a sample of 163 participants (see Table 1). Based on the
scoring protocol for empathy developed by Batson et al. (1997), the scores for the
individual questions were summed to yield a total score. Both the Batson and Howell
measures were used, but the Batson measure demonstrated greater reliability and was the
only empathy measure that yielded significant results. Based on this measure, an outlier
analysis was conducted and three participants were deleted from further statistical
consideration.
The final distribution of participants is found below in Table 1:
Table 1. Distribution of Participants
Male

Female

Hindsight/Emp Hindsight/NoEmp Foresight

N

89

74

54

55

54

%

55

45

33

34

33

Empathy Induction
To test the hypothesis that induced empathy would lead to an increase in the
hindsight bias effect, a 2 (order) x 2 (males, females) x 3 (hindsight with empathy,
hindsight without empathy, foresight without empathy) MANOVA was used to examine
the effectiveness of the empathy manipulation. The empathy manipulation consisted of
two measures, the Batson et al. (1997) and the Howell (2006) empathy method of
assessment. Except for a significant effect due to order, F (2, 150) = 25.17, p < .001, no
13

other significant effect related to the empathy manipulation was noted. Examination of
the univariates showed the effect was only found with the Batson measure, F (1, 151) =
43.12, p < .001. The participants who completed the hindsight bias ratings before
completing the Traumatic-Related Guilt Inventory (TRGI) showed significantly higher
levels of empathy than participants who completed the TRGI prior to the hindsight bias
ratings. The overall mean varied, M = 5.15 (Howell measure) to 5.52 (Batson measure)
on a 7-point scale. Hence, no evidence was supportive of the effectiveness of the empathy
manipulation.
Evidence of Hindsight Bias
With regard to evidence supportive of hindsight bias, a 2 (order) x 2 (gender) x 3
(sight) MANOVA was conducted using measures relevant to hindsight bias: probability,
certainty, goodness, difficulty, disappointment, and surprise of the outcome. This analysis
yielded a significant effect only for the sight conditions, F (12, 288) = 5.39, p < .001.
Further examination of the univariate analyses revealed two measures of significance.
The probability ratings were significant among the sight conditions, F (2, 148) = 4.86, p
< .009, and for disappointment F (2, 148) = 13.16, p < .001. Further examination of this
difference via Tukey’s showed that within the probability ratings, the foresight group
differed significantly from the hindsight with empathy condition (Foresight, M = 6.90,
SD = 1.39; hindsight with empathy, M = 5.91, SD = 1.71), p < .007, but not from
hindsight without empathy (M = 6.31, SD = 1.73), p > .05. The two hindsight conditions
did not differ significantly from one another, p > .05. Although the foresight condition
differed significantly from the hindsight with empathy condition, no evidence was found
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supportive of hindsight bias by comparing the two non-empathy groups of foresight and
hindsight.
Similar to the probability measure, for disappointment there was no significant
difference (p > .05) between the foresight condition and the hindsight without empathy
condition, and there was a significant difference between the foresight (M = 7.29, SD =
1.72) and hindsight with empathy (M = 8.63, SD = 0.94) conditions, p < .001. However,
unlike the probability measure, a significant difference was seen between the two
hindsight conditions (Hindsight without empathy, M = 7.62, SD = 1.46). Participants in
the foresight group showed the same degree of disappointment as participants in the
hindsight without empathy group, and participants in the hindsight with empathy group
showed significantly less disappointment.
Exploratory Research
In an exploratory fashion, the possible impact of prevention information on
hindsight bias based on Kubany et al. (1996) previous research was examined. After their
initial judgments, hindsight participants received prevention information to allow for an
assessment of change in their ratings as a result of the prevention information compared
to the non-prevention information for the foresight condition. A 2 (assessments) x 2
(gender) x 3 (sight) repeated measures MANOVA was conducted for each of the
following measures. The Trauma-Related Guilt Inventory (TRGI), created by Kubany
(1996), contains four subscales: Hindsight Bias/Responsibility, Distress, Wrongdoing,
and Justification. Regardless of the information provided, participants showed a
significant change in their ratings from time 1 to time 2 for each measure. Participants
reported that Hindsight Bias/Responsibility decreased significantly, F (1, 150) = 513.45,
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p < .001, along with Justification, F (1, 151) = 11.11, p < .001, and Distress, F (1, 151) =
308.67, p < .001. In contrast to these measures, their sense of Wrongdoing increased, F
(1, 151) = 117.65, p < .001 (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations).
Overall, simply giving participants additional information (regardless of
relevance) encourages a change in their responses. Thus, participants felt less responsible,
distressed, justified, but felt an increased sense of wrongdoing. Also, for each of these
measures, there was a significant or marginally significant interaction of the sight
conditions by assessment, p’s < .10. However, examination of the pattern of the
interactions for the various measures was not meaningful.
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations for the TRGI
Time 1
Mean
SD

Time 2
Mean
SD

Hindsight
Bias/Responsibility 6.01

0.95

3.96

0.70

Justification

2.36

0.80

2.55

0.82

Distress

2.37

0.77

3.17

0.64

Wrongdoing

4.33

0.62

3.78

0.66
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Chapter 4
DISCUSSION
For the primary hypothesis of hindsight bias varying with empathy, the empathy
manipulation did not increase participants’ empathetic responses, as demonstrated by
their empathy ratings. Although the probability and disappointment measures yielded
significant effects, no evidence of the hindsight bias effect was noted when comparing
the foresight and hindsight without empathy conditions. For disappointment, a significant
difference was seen between the hindsight without empathy and hindsight with empathy
conditions. No significant difference was seen between these conditions for the
probability measure though the results were in the same direction. Furthermore, the
mixed findings of a significant difference for disappointment but not probability, and an
ineffective empathy manipulation, when comparing the two hindsight conditions (with or
without empathy), do not provide an adequate examination of the role of empathy, as
hypothesized to be a factor relevant to the fluency attribution hypothesis (Bernstein &
Marley, 2007).
Regarding the secondary hypothesis, the study examined the role of prevention
information for Hindsight Bias/Responsibility (Kubany et al., 1996). Kubany argued that
prevention information increased participants’ levels of Hindsight Bias/Responsibility.
However, the current study showed that giving participants any type of information,
regardless of its relevancy to the scenario, encouraged a decrease in their responses for
the measures of Hindsight Bias/Responsibility, and also for Justification and Distress, but
an increase for Wrongdoing.
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Unexpectedly, the empathy manipulation was not effective. Three possible
reasons for this ineffectiveness may be the story’s content, the empathy induction
method, and when empathy was assessed. Because all participants, regardless of
condition, reported high levels of empathy, the severity of the car accident scenario
triggered a great deal of empathy, and because the empathy level was so great this
resulted in a ceiling effect. A second reason is the empathy induction did not allow for an
assessment of differences between the empathy and no empathy conditions. Batson et al.,
(1997) for their empathy manipulation asked participants to either remain objective or
imagine themselves in the situation. Using this manipulation, Batson et al. found
significant differences between the two groups. In Tykocinski et al., (2002), participants
were asked to imagine themselves or a friend in the situation. They also found significant
differences between groups, but the story (loss of a stipend) was much less devastating.
Thus, in some scenarios an appropriate empathy induction could be simply a distinction
between imagining oneself or a friend. However, in a more tragic scenario (i.e. a car
accident), asking participants to either imagine themselves in the situation or remain
objective may be necessary in order to distinguish between empathy and no empathy
conditions. A third possible reason is that participants were asked to complete the
empathy ratings immediately after reading the story, which resulted in all participants
reacting empathically after initially reading the scenario. In future studies, having
participants complete the empathy ratings later, or even twice, may give a more accurate
assessment of their empathy levels and differences.
As noted earlier, no significant effect was seen for hindsight bias when comparing
the foresight no empathy to the hindsight no empathy conditions. The hindsight with
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empathy condition reported the outcome was less likely to occur and were less
disappointed than the foresight without empathy condition. However, this outcome was
confounded due to the hindsight group receiving the empathy manipulation and the
outcome of the story, while the foresight condition received neither. In spite of the
confounded outcomes, they are consistent with the previous research by Tykocinski et al
(2002), who found participants in hindsight conditions reported the outcome of the story
was significantly less likely than did participants in the foresight condition. Similar to the
current findings, they also found that participants in the empathy condition were
significantly less disappointed than participants in the no empathy condition. These
findings support her notion of retroactive pessimism, in which the participants attempt to
distance themselves from their own role in the outcome by insisting they 1) did not know
what was going to happen and 2) are less disappointed in the outcome.
Finally, in an exploratory fashion, the study looked at the possible impact of
prevention information on Hindsight Bias/Responsibility. Kubany argued that giving
participants prevention information increased their levels of Hindsight
Bias/Responsibility. However, regardless of the type of information received, participants
not only reported a decrease for Hindsight Bias/Responsibility, but also for Justification
and Distress. This could be because participants felt obligated to change their ratings
from time 1 to time 2. Thus, these results do not support Kubany’s assertion that
prevention information increases levels of Hindsight Bias/Responsibility. A more
appropriate assessment of whether Hindsight Bias/Responsibility changes with
prevention information is to use a research design that has hindsight groups with neutral
and no information, as well as prevention information.
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Understanding the role of empathy and how it affects individuals’ perceptions of
outcomes is important for two reasons. First, if empathy does indeed lead to a stronger
affective response in people, this could increase the severity of symptoms in various
disorders (i.e. depression or post-traumatic stress disorder). Second, if empathy does
trigger retroactive pessimism in individuals, in a situation similar to the scenario about
the car accident, people may try to distance themselves from what happened in order to
feel less responsible. Another example is a college student who fails an exam. If she tells
herself she is not disappointed about the failing grade, she will feel less responsible. For
people in both examples, they may be less disappointed in an attempt to distance
themselves from the situation.
From a clinical perspective, the therapist may be influenced by retroactive
pessimism and distance themselves from clients. Being a therapist requires a delicate
balance between showing empathy and maintaining a professional demeanor. It is
possible that therapists could be influenced by retroactive pessimism and remain unaware
of its effects. The concept of retroactive pessimism is similar to that of vicarious
traumatization in that they both often function outside of the therapist’s awareness.
Vicarious traumatization means the therapist has become too involved and has taken on a
client’s symptoms, whereas retroactive pessimism would mean the therapist is attempting
to distance him/herself from the client. This could have a negative impact on the
therapeutic relationship, and thus retroactive pessimism requires further investigation to
fully understand its possible effects on therapists.
Finally, Kubany’s et al (2005) assertion that Hindsight Bias/Responsibility varies
with prevention information, which was not substantiated by the findings, remains an
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issue. Specifically, if people believe they could have done something different to change
a tragic outcome, they could begin to feel extreme levels of guilt. This could lead to a
variety of clinical issues and disorders, as well as an increase in the severity of the
disorder.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Informed Consent
This study deals with empathy and the reactions people have to distressing events. It
includes reading over a traumatic scenario and answering questions about your response
to the event. In this study, you will be asked to read over a scenario about a serious car
accident and make some ratings about your responses. This should take about 35 to 45
minutes.
Your ratings and questionnaire will be confidential and unavailable to other students
in the class or the study. Participation in this study is totally voluntary, and you may
withdraw from the study at any time without penalty. If you do, please sit quietly in your
seat until the end of testing so that you won’t disturb the other students. Feel free to ask if
you have any questions or contact me at MGowen@missouristate.edu or my faculty
supervisor Dr. David Lutz at DavidLutz@missouristate.edu.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation and participation.
Sincerely,

Malindi Gowen
Clinical Psychology Masters Student
I have read and understand the information presented above, and any questions I had
were answered satisfactorily by Malindi Gowen.
I hereby agree to participate in the study described above.
Name (PLEASE PRINT):_______________________________
Gender:__________________
Class __________________ Time/Day: ________ Professor:
_______________________
Signature: _____________________________________
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Date _________________

Appendix B: Demographic Information Form
Briefly describe your thoughts and feelings as you participated in this study:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__________________
Demographic Information
Experimenter: ___________________
Your Age: ____________________Today’s Date:___________________________
Your Gender: ( ) MaleClass:__________________________________
( ) FemaleDays/Time PSY 121 meets:_________________
Your Race/Ethnicity: ( ) Asian/Pacific Islander
( ) Hispanic/Latino
( ) Native American
( ) White/European American
( ) Other: ____________________
When you are finished, raise your hand so that your booklet can be collected, then you
may leave quietly or sit quietly until the rest of the students are finished to receive more
information about the study.

26

Appendix C: Scenario for Condition A, Hindsight with Empathy
Imagine that you are driving in your car between Springfield and Branson. Suddenly,
you come across an automobile accident, and there are several cars already parked around
the accident scene. You rush to assist, and learn that a pickup truck had crossed over the
median and hit a car. You are shocked to see that the driver is one of your closest friends.
Your friend is narrowly wedged inside the car because the steering wheel is compressed
against his/her chest, and you can see your friend has life-threatening injuries and is
bleeding profusely. Your friend sees you and calls out your name. You do not know what
to do, so you try to help the people who are trying to get your friend out of the car.
Unfortunately, they cannot even get the door open because it is smashed shut. Then
people try to pry open the door with a tire iron, but unfortunately it’s too late, and your
friend dies.

27

Appendix D: Scenario for Condition B, Hindsight without Empathy
Imagine that a friend tells you this story. This friend was driving her car between
Springfield and Branson. Suddenly, she came across an automobile accident, and there
were several cars already parked around the accident scene. Your friend rushed to assist,
and learn that a pickup truck had crossed over the median and hit a car. The friend was
shocked to see that the driver was one of her closest friends. She was narrowly wedged
inside the car because the steering wheel was compressed against her chest, and the
friend could see her life-threatening injuries and profuse bleeding. The person inside the
car saw your friend and called out her name. The friend did not know what to do, so she
tried to help the people who were trying to get the friend out of the car. Unfortunately,
they cannot even get the door open because it is smashed shut. Then people tried to pry
open the door with a tire iron, but unfortunately it was too late, and the friend died.
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Appendix E: Scenario for Condition C, Foresight without Empathy
Imagine that a friend tells you this story. This friend was driving her car between
Springfield and Branson. Suddenly, she came across an automobile accident, and there
were several cars already parked around the accident scene. Your friend rushed to assist,
and learn that a pickup truck had crossed over the median and hit a car. The friend was
shocked to see that the driver was one of her closest friends. She was narrowly wedged
inside the car because the steering wheel was compressed against her chest, and the
friend could see her life-threatening injuries and profuse bleeding. The person inside the
car saw your friend and called out her name. The friend did not know what to do, so she
tried to help the people who were trying to get the friend out of the car. Unfortunately,
they cannot even get the door open because it is smashed shut. Then people tried to pry
open the door with a tire iron.
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Appendix F: Condition A, Hindsight with Empathy, Additional Information
Afterwards, it is hard for you to stop thinking about the accident. You wonder if
you could have done something to save your friend. All of a sudden, it occurs to you that
in the back of your car, you have a chain that you use to attach a trailer to your boat. If
you had tied that chain around the crumpled door frame and attached to your car, it would
have been possible to yank the door off, and get your friend out of the car. You might
have been able to help your friend—if only you had done that.

30

Appendix G: Condition B, Hindsight without Empathy, Additional Information
Afterwards, it was hard for your friend to stop thinking about the accident. She
wondered if she could have done something to save her friend. All of a sudden, it
occurred to her that in the back of her car, she had a chain that she uses to attach a trailer
to her boat. If she had tied that chain around the crumpled door frame and attached to her
car, it would have been possible to yank the door off, and get her friend out of the car.
She might have been able to help her friend—if only she had done that.
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Appendix H: Condition C, Foresight without Empathy, Neutral Information
In December 1903, on a sandspit at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, Orville and Wilbur
Wright were putting the finishing touches on a “whopper flying machine” they had built
at their bicycle shop in Dayton, Ohio, and shipped to Kitty Hawk for tests. Confident of
success, Orville went a telegram to his father in Dayton urging secrecy. Then quite
suddenly on December 17 the deed was done. The two brothers piloted their flimsy,
jerry-built machine on a series of wobbly flights, the longest one lasting 59 seconds and
covering 852 feet.
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Appendix I: Condition A, Hindsight with Empathy, Empathy Ratings
The following questions refer to your feelings.
1. How sympathetic do you feel toward your friend?
1234567
Not at all Extremely
2. How compassionate do you feel toward your friend?
1234567
Not at all Extremely
3. How softhearted do you feel toward your friend?
1234567
Not at all Extremely
4. How kind do you feel toward your friend?
1234567
Not at all Extremely
5. How caring do you feel toward your friend?
1234567
Not at all Extremely
6. I was able to put myself in the story.
1234567
Not at all Extremely
7. I was able to consider the thoughts I would have if this really happened to me.
1234567
Not at all Extremely
8. The scenario created a realistic description of the accident.
1234567
Not at all Extremely
9. I was able to picture myself at the scene, actually experiencing this event.
1234567
Not at all Extremely
10. I was able to connect with the emotions I would have if this really happened to me.
1234567
Not at all Extremely
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Appendix J: Condition B & C, Hindsight and Foresight without Empathy, Empathy
Ratings
The following questions refer to your friend’s feelings.
1. How sympathetic do you feel toward your friend?
1234567
Not at all Extremely
2. How compassionate do you feel toward your friend?
1234567
Not at all Extremely
3. How softhearted do you feel toward your friend?
1234567
Not at all Extremely
4. How kind do you feel toward your friend?
1234567
Not at all Extremely
5. How caring do you feel toward your friend?
1234567
Not at all Extremely
6. I was able to put myself in the place of my friend in the story.
1234567
Not at all Extremely
7. I was able to consider the thoughts I would have if this really happened to me.
1234567
Not at all Extremely
8. The story created a realistic description of the accident.
1234567
Not at all Extremely
9. I was able to picture myself at the scene, actually experiencing this event.
1234567
Not at all Extremely
10. I was able to connect with the emotions I would have if this really happened to me.
1234567
Not at all Extremely
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Appendix K: Condition A, Hindsight with Empathy, Probabilistic Ratings
11. Assume you did not know that your friend died, what is the probability that you
would have predicted that your friend died from the accident?
123456789
Not at all Extremely
12. I am certain about the outcome.
123456789
Not at all Extremely
13. I made a good prediction about the outcome.
123456789
Not at allExtremely
14. It was difficult to predict the outcome.
123456789
Not at allExtremely
15. How disappointed would you be that your friend died from the accident?
123456789
Not at allExtremely
16. How surprising would it be if your friend survived?
123456789
Not at allExtremely
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Appendix L: Condition B, Hindsight without Empathy, Probabilistic Ratings
11. Assume you did not know that your friend’s friend died, what is the probability that
your friend’s friend died from the accident?
123456789
Not at allExtremely
12. I am certain about the outcome.
123456789
Not at allExtremely
13. I made a good prediction about the outcome.
123456789
Not at allExtremely
14. It was difficult to predict the outcome.
123456789
Not at allExtremely
15. How disappointed would you be that your friend’s friend died from the accident?
123456789
Not at allExtremely
16. How surprising would it be if your friend’s friend survived?
123456789
Not at allExtremely
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Appendix M: Condition C, Foresight without Empathy, Probabilistic Ratings
11. What is the probability that your friend’s friend died from the accident?
123456789
Not at allExtremely
12. I am certain about the outcome.
123456789
Not at allExtremely
13. I made a good prediction about the outcome.
123456789
Not at allExtremely
14. It was difficult to predict the outcome.
123456789
Not at allExtremely
15. How disappointed would you be that your friend’s friend died from the accident?
123456789
Not at allExtremely
16. How surprising would it be if your friend’s friend survived?
123456789
Not at allExtremely
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Appendix N: Condition A, Hindsight with Empathy, Trauma-Related Guilt
Inventory, Revised
Please take a few moments to think about what happened in the story you just read. All
the items below refer to the events related to the car accident and your predicted outcome.
Circle the answer that best describes how you feel about each statement.
17. I could have prevented what happened.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

18. I am still distressed about the accident.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

19. I had some feelings that I should not have had.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

20. What I did was completely justified.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

21. I was responsible for causing what happened.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

22. What happened causes me emotional pain.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

23. I did something that went against my values.
Extremely true

Very true

24. What I did made sense.
Extremely true

Very true

25. I knew better than to do what I did.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

26. I feel sorrow or grief about the accident.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true
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27. What I did was inconsistent with my beliefs.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

28. If I knew now only what I knew when the event occurred – I would do exactly the
same thing.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

29. I experience intense guilt that relates to what happened.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

30. I should have known better.
Extremely true

Very true

31. I experience severe emotional distress when I think about the accident.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

32. I had some thoughts or beliefs that I should not have had.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

33. I had good reasons for doing what I did.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

34. How often do you think you would experience guilt about what happened.
Never

Seldom

Occasionally

Often

Always

35. I blame myself for what happened.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

36. What happened causes me a lot of pain and suffering.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

37. I should have had certain feelings that I did not have.
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Not at all true

Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

38. How intense or severe would your feelings of guilt be about what happened.
None

Slight

Moderate

Considerable

Extreme

39. I blame myself for something I did, thought, or felt.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

40. When I am reminded of the accident, I have strong physical reactions such as sweating,
tense muscles, dry mouth, etc.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

41. Overall, how guilty do you feel about what happened?
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

42. I hold myself responsible for what happened.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

43. What I did was not justified in any way.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

44. I violated personal standards of right and wrong.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

45. I did something that I should not have done.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

46. I should have done something that I did not do.
Extremely true

Very true

47. What I did was unforgivable.
Extremely true

Very true

48. I didn’t do anything wrong.
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Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true
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Slightly true

Not at all true

Appendix O: Condition B & C, Hindsight and Foresight without Empathy, TraumaRelated Guilt Inventory, Revised
Please take a few moments to think about what happened in the story you just read. All
the items below refer to the events related to the car accident and your predicted outcome.
Circle the answer that best describes how you feel about each statement.
17. Your friend could have prevented what happened.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

18. Your friend is still distressed about the accident.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

19. Your friend has some feelings that she should not have had.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

20. What your friend did was completely justified.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

21. Your friend was responsible for causing what happened.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

22. What happened causes your friend emotional pain.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

23. Your friend did something that went against her values.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

24. What your friend did made sense.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

25. Your friend knew better than to do what she did.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

26. Your friend feels sorrow or grief about the accident.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true
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Slightly true

Not at all true

27. What your friend did was inconsistent with her beliefs.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

28. If your friend knew now only what she knew when the event occurred – she would do
exactly the same thing.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

29. Your friend experiences intense guilt that relates to what happened.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

30. Your friend should have known better.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

31. Your friend experiences severe emotional distress when she thinks about the accident.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

32. Your friend had some thoughts or beliefs that she should not have had.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

33. Your friend had good reasons for doing what she did.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

34. How often do you think your friend would experience guilt about what happened.
Never

Seldom

Occasionally

Often

Always

35. Your friend blames herself for what happened.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

36. What happened causes your friend a lot of pain and suffering.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

37. Your friend should have had certain feelings that she did not have.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

43

Slightly true

Not at all true

38. How intense or severe would your friend’s feelings of guilt be about what happened.
None

Slight

Moderate

Considerable

Extreme

39. Your friend blames herself for something she did, thought, or felt.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

40. When your friend is reminded of the accident, she has strong physical reactions such as
sweating, tense muscles, dry mouth, etc.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

41. Overall, how guilty does your friend feel about what happened?
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

42. Your friend holds herself responsible for what happened.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

43. What your friend did was not justified in any way.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

44. Your friend violated personal standards of right and wrong.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

45. Your friend did something that she should not have done.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

46. Your friend should have done something that she did not do.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

Slightly true

Not at all true

Slightly true

Not at all true

47. What your friend did was unforgivable.
Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

48. Your friend didn’t do anything wrong.

44

Extremely true

Very true

Somewhat true

45

Slightly true

Not at all true

